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There must be a sore temptation in some sulking Govern-
ment quarters to regard the so-called "indecisive" Scottish 
referendum as an event which seriously discredits this particular 
method of popular consultation. The reason is that, unlike the 
1975 Common Market referendum, this one committed the 
unforgiveable sin of giving the Government the answer they 
didn't want. Far from getting them off an awkward political 
hook, it has impaled Labour even more firmly than before. 
This has been a severe caution to politicians about the 
unexpected perils of "asking the people". And, as a matter 
of fact, that warning applies just as much to future Conservative 
governments, however loudly the Tories may now be crowing 
about the way they imagine this particular poll has vindicated 
their trust in the permanence of the Union and the wisdom of 
the electors. 
For, whether it is about complex constitutional matters 
like this, or about more sharply-focused issues like trade union 
rights, individual liberties or even penal reform (all of which 
have been suggested, from time to time, as subjects for con-
sultative polls), the fact is that at the end of the day only 
governments can order referendums. What this one has shown 
is that governments can sometimes get it wrong. 
Of course, it is perfectly possible to represent this poll as 
some kind of mystical vehicle of divine justice. Didn't Labour, 
after all, get exactly what they deserved? They were unable to 
agree about the Scottish Assembly proposals in Parliament. So 
they passed the parcel to the people. The people shook it. 
squeezed it, listened to it and promptly passed it back again. 
* This article is reprinted from The Scotsman of 16 March 1979 with 
the kind permission of the editor. 
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"I don't know what's in it either, mate. Here, you take it. Any-
way, Tam says it's ticking." 
In any case, should we necessarily be surprised that the 
people, having taken a bewildered lead from their confused 
elected representatives, should have produced such an appro-
priately ambivalent result? The debate in Parliament and the 
campaign itself had both been confusing enough, in all con-
science, so why shouldn't the result reflect this? 
On the "Yes" side, the crucial ambiguity, which continues 
to disfigure the parliamentary debate about what to do next, 
is how on earth Labour could seriously propose that a Scottish 
Assembly would strengthen the UK, when their main campaign 
allies, the Nationalists, said it was the first step to independence. 
On the "No" side, the principal contradiction, which will 
contort discussion for just as long, is how on earth the Tories 
could seriously hint at a richer pot of gold at the end of another 
devolution rainbow, when most of them are quite clearly pre-
pared to regard a "No" vote (even this minority one) as the 
absolute end of the matter. 
The referendum was quite unable to resolve these incon-
sistencies. Indeed, it reinforced them. It did so because of its 
central defect: the fact that, whatever the original intention, 
the poll was very soon transformed from being a straightforward 
test of the popular acceptability of the Scotland Act, into an 
additional subterranean battle about the popular acceptability 
of the Government. 
This shaped the tactics on both sides. It enabled the Tories 
to unite solidly behind the expectation that a "No" vote would 
cripple the government in its most vulnerable year. Labour 
managers encouraged this by assuming at the outset that the 
poll would be a convenient and final celebration of their party's 
regained ascendancy in. Scotland, just before a General Election. 
In this, the referendum was simply an extension of the Scotland 
Act itself, which the Government had insisted on treating as a 
purely Labour party matter. 
The message was clear enough. If Labour were going to 
be obliged to have this confounded Assembly, then by heavens 
they would make sure they shared with no one the credit for 
having delivered it. They proceeded in a manner which effec-
tively excluded from any working relationship all those Conserva-
tives, Liberals and Nationalists whose personality or machinery 
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could have helped them deliver the full potential "Yes" vote. 
For the politicians the main lesson in all this is surely the 
clear demonstration of three dangers: the first is the danger of 
putting the Government's authority on the line through a 
referendum called on a specifically sectional issue; the second 
is the danger of doing so when the Government's own party 
has such internal doubts as to be incapable of providing enough 
troops on the day; and the final danger is in chosing a time for 
the poll when the result itself is put in hazard by the unpopular 
management of totally unrelated issues like - in this instance 
- pay policy and industrial relations. 
For the rest of us - the two-thirds who voted both this 
time and last - the main lesson is surely the way the Scottish 
exercise has now confirmed what we may only have suspected 
in 1975: that we were not after all, as we may have fondly 
imagined, engaged in a solemn and historic consultation with 
our parliamentarians. 
Only now is it possible to see the reality . . . that the 
device of the referendum is in fact little more than a shabby 
plaything of party politicians whose most spectacular facility 
throughout has been the perfectly dazzling display of fancy 
skating around some of the accepted conventions of British 
democracy. 
It is thi·s, much more than the Government's insufferable 
hand-wringing about the "inconclusive" result, which goes 
furthest towards discrediting the still-popular idea of the 
referendum as a useful and lasting part of the constitutional 
machinery of this country. Its validity will only be restored 
properly if we draw on the experience of this unsavoury Scottish 
poll to establish now some clear rules and firm understandings 
about the conduct of referendums in the future. 
There are five quite specific respects in which Parliament 
badly needs to do itself and the rest of us a favour by thinking 
again about the non-existence of referendum rules, and about 
the propriety of those which have already been established 
through the "case law" of the two polls we have had so far. 
These are: 
1. Timing 
The Common Market poll established that the Government 
would dictate the timing of the poll, in much the same way as 
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they have prerogative to decide the date of a General Election 
at the most favourable moment in a five-year term. The Scottish 
exercise significantly modified that freedom. 
A legislative amendment and a verbal promise extracted 
by the Assembly opponents ensured that this particular poll 
could not be held during the month immediately before or the 
three months immediately after a General Election. This helped 
to guarantee that the referendum became a secondary pawn in 
the primary manoeuvrings about the timing of an Election. 
With almost eighteen months of Labour's term still to run, 
the opponents' amendment nevertheless made it impossible for 
the Government to make an immediate announcement about the 
timing of the referendum without also closing some of the early 
options for the all-important Election. For a critical period last 
summer, therefore, the date of the referendum had to be as 
uncertain and secret as that of the Election. 
The way in which the referendum became inextricably 
bound up with the fate of the Government was a massive initial 
distraction from the debate about the issue of devolution itself. 
For future referendums the Government should announce the 
timing of the poll as part of the legislative package - much as 
was done, in fact, with the Common Market referendum. 
2. Threshold 
Both the Common Market and the Scottish referendums 
were "advisory". In theory Parliament retained the right to 
say that it would not consider itself bound by the result, however 
clear the majority. In practice, MPs did accept the straight 
67-33% UK "Yes" majority on a 65% poll in 1975. 
They broke new ground, however, with the Scottish poll 
by setting a voting threshold below which the Scottish Assembly 
scheme could not be considered entirely secure. If the "Yes" 
votes represented less than 40% of all those entitled to vote, then 
MPs would be given a chance to reject this year's straight 
52-48% "Yes" majority on a 64% poll, and repeal the whole 
legislation. 
This tricky little notion established two things. First, no 
matter how much MPs may protest the opposite, it did in fact 
breach the theory of the referendum as a purely advisory device. 
It not only instructed the Government on a specific course of 
action following a sub-40% "Yes" vote. In doing so it also 
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tacitly defined the mandate for implementation - for a "Yes" 
vote of more than 40% would clearly have had the moral force 
to bind Parliament, without the sour argument we are now 
having. 
Secondly, it introduced an entirely new concept into British 
politics by ensuring that the final judgement of the result 
would take account of those who did not vote. On 1 March 
there were just as many abstainers as in 1975. But this time 
they have effectively been laid against the "Yes" total in a 
way which permits the Assembly opponents to proclaim, quite 
predictably, that 67% of the eligible voters did not want devolu-
tion. How many of them claim, by the same token, that 56% 
of eligible voters did not want the UK to stay in the Common 
Market? 
There is a perfectly respectable case for inventing a yard-
stick to measure popular enthusiasm for a constitutional change 
of this sort - let us say two-thirds of those voting. There is 
absolutely no respectable argument for doing it in this way. 
It quite needlessly convulsed and embittered the campaign and 
damaged the prospect of reconciliation in the aftermath. More-
over, it set our electoral registration system a task for which 
it was never designed and for which it proved to be no match. 
If MPs are ever tempted to play with this toy again, they 
will prevent it being regarded as a tawdry manipulation only 
by making two gestures: first, by ordering beforehand a com-
prehensive overhaul of our creaking and, in parts, rotten annual 
survey of eligible voters; and second, by insisting beforehand 
on a substantial increase in the scope and effectiveness of the 
postal franchise for the many thousands of voters whose disable-
ment, illness and removal enforced their abstention when it 
really mattered. 
3. Information 
The Government made a serious error of judgement in not 
issuing a simple explanatory leaflet to all voters about the pro-
posed change. This was done during the Common Market 
referendum. But on this occasion, the opponents of devolution 
threatened behind the scenes to withhold financial authority 
for the publication on the quite spurious grounds that it would 
be impossible to produce an unbiased description of the scheme. 
The Government believed these threats and caved in. As 
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a result we are now being treated to febrile claims from the 
very people who were instrumental in preventing the distribution 
of such a leaflet, that voters did not understand the issues. 
In any future referendum, finance should be allowed for such 
a leaflet. Its "neutrality" could quite easily be guaranteed by 
an all-party committee. 
4. Broadcasting 
The Scottish campaign has left the normal understandings 
about Party Political Broadcasting (PPBS) in a total confusion. 
Tam Dalyell will not easily be forgiven for putting an elegant 
Etonian knee into the groin of Keir Hardie House, by persuad-
ing the Court of Session to ban the projected PPBs because 
they would have favoured the "Yes" side in a ratio of three-to-one. 
Yet he had no alternative. Labour were determined to deny 
their influential "No" rebels the airtime which common fairness 
suggested they were entitled to have. The Court of Session 
ruling seems to have established that sponsored broadcasting 
during referendums should be sanctioned only on a strict "Yes-
No" division, and not according to party interests. 
That seems fair enough, but only if the ruling is now 
used to work out some clear new understandings about equality 
of access to sponsored broadcasting for future referendums. 
5. Money 
It is a simple fact that neither of the two British referen-
dums have been regulated by any rules regarding finance. In 
normal elections, there are quite strict limitations on the amount 
of money that constituency organisations are permitted to spend 
to solicit votes. An election agent's accounts are open to legal 
challenge. 
These requirements have not applied to the referendums. 
Even if it was impossible (which it is not) to ensure an upper 
limit of expenditure by both sides, it should certainly not be 
impossible to insist on the publication of campaign accounts. 
It is, finally, a fair bet that not one single political finger 
will be raised in a serious effort to achieve any of these five 
reforms, as a means of rekindling the notion of fairness in the 
public's perception of the referendum device. By the time the 
next one comes round, the political circumstances will have 
changed - and so, you can be absolutely certain, will the 
rules. 
